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This article was originally published in the June 9, 2020 edition of In The Cattle Markets.
In recent weeks there has been increased attention given to the role of Alternative Marketing
Arrangements, commonly referred to as AMA's, in the fed cattle market. The use of these
AMA’s varies greatly by region and some of the more common AMA’s used include grid and
formula pricing. AMA’s pay producers premiums and discounts from a ‘base price’ based on a
combination of the yield grade, quality grade, and weight of dressed cattle. It is common for the
negotiated cash price to serve as the ‘base price’ for AMA’s using the either the geographical
region or the 5-market average. The decline in negotiated cash trade has varied by geographical
region causing some market participants to wonder if the ‘base price’ truly reflects the local
demand for cattle. For example, cattle formula priced in Texas using the 5-market average could,
in certain weeks, be heavily weighted towards Nebraska and Iowa prices.
However, the current concern surrounding AMA’s has more to do with lower cash prices
received by producers due to market reactions to COVID-19 than the role of AMA’s role in
thinly traded markets. In an effort to effectively raise producer received prices, market

participants have introduced a series of price and supply control proposals. The U.S. Senate, led
by Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) and Senator Jon Tester (D-MT), have proposed a law that
would mandate large-scale packers to procure a minimum of 50 percent of total cattle purchased
in the cash market each week – commonly referred to as the ‘50-14’ rule. The hope is that by
increasing cash trade transactions it will solve issues with price discovery effectively increasing
negotiated cash prices. Supply of fed cattle and demand for wholesale beef determines the price
of fed cattle. In order to increase fed cattle prices, the ’50-14’ rule would either need to reduce
the supply of fed cattle or increase the demand for wholesale beef. While the rule would increase
negotiated cash transactions helping in price discovery in a given week, it is unlikely to affect the
underlying fed cattle market supply and demand conditions to effectively increase cash price
levels.
Two other efforts to increase cash transactions, in hopes of increasing cash prices, is ‘bid-thegrid’ through the Fed Cattle Exchange platform and the ‘set aside’ program (similar to the one
used in Canada). Many details and questions still lack regarding the ‘bid-the-grid’ process and
potential efficacy in increasing regional cash trade. Its aim is to increase prices by having each
producer negotiate grid the starting base price. While this may help in price discovery (i.e.
arriving at a transaction price for a given quality and quantity of a product at a given time and
place) this method once again falls short of fundamentally changing price determination. The ‘set
aside’ program aims to control the number of cattle that enter the market each week that can be
processed. Producers would be paid a set amount per day to compensate for the cost of feeding.
Who would be willing to pay for the program as well as program start and end dates is likewise
uncertain. This may help reduce the backlog due to packing plant closures, cattle will be
processed quickly as soon as food service demand increases.
So what has been happening to cattle transactions (i.e. negotiated cash, forward contract,
formula, and negotiated grid) during COVID-19? Looking at all cattle in the U.S., formula
transactions have largely been replaced by negotiated grid. For example, in April formula trade
was 74% of total weekly transactions and negotiated grid was 4%. In May formula trade fell to
48% and negotiated grid was 20%. The past few weeks cattle sold on formula has steadily
increased while cattle on the negotiated grid have decreased. There has been little change in the
negotiated cash and forward contract trade, on average for the U.S., since January 1, 2020. As in
most cases there were significant differences across geographical regions. Formula trade fell in
the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico region but not below 5-year historical levels. This was offset
by trade in the negotiated grid. Formula priced cattle fell from 95% of cattle priced in April to
30% in May. This was replaced entirely by negotiated grid priced cattle. In both the TexasOklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas region there was little movement in the negotiated price.
Pricing in Nebraska has been somewhat more volatile. Negotiated cash fell a historic low of 2%
of transactions in May and entirely offset by increased formula trade. Negotiated grid and
forward contract transactions were historically constant.
Since negotiated cattle can be sold either live or dressed final cash payment is always determined
by quantity (i.e. lbs. of animal/carcass) times negotiated price. Formula or grid priced cattle rely
upon a base price plus discounts or premiums for cattle quality or characteristics. Premiums for
quality are paid for carcasses grading Prime or Certified Angus Beef (CAB) or production
practices such as ‘All Natural’ or ‘Non Hormone Treated Cattle’ (NHTC). Choice is the base

quality grade and discounts are applied to carcasses grading select. Figure 1 plots the grid
premiums and discounts for the 5-market average between 2018 and 2020. Since Jan 1, 2020
NHTC and ‘All Natural’ premiums have remained constant, CAB premiums have increased,
Prime premiums have decreased, and Select discounts have increased. The difference between
Choice and Select, commonly referred to as the Choice-Select spread, is largely consistent with
historical patterns of widening during the first quarter. The deterioration in the premium for
Prime and the sharp increase in CAB are abnormal. One reason for the deterioration in the
premium for Prime product is likely due to the reduced demand for high end steaks at restaurants
from quarantine restrictions accompanied by an increase in supply due to fed cattle being on feed
longer as packing plant closed.
Grids or formulas also require cattle carcasses to be within a given weight range, generally
between 600-900 lbs. on dressed basis. Cattle that fall outside of these limits are discounted.
Cattle slaughter weight has increased as packing plants closed causing reduced packing capacity
and cattle to be on feed longer than anticipated. For example, the dressed weight for steers and
heifers has increased by about 10 lbs. at a time when dressed weight historically decreases. So
how have weight discounts changed since January? Figure 2 plots the weight discounts for the 5market average from 2018-2020. Weight discounts were constant for all weights prior to January
1, 2020. After that, the discount for cattle carcasses over 1050 lbs. has decreased. In other words,
packers discounted heavy carcasses less than in months and years prior. All other weight
discounts have remained unchanged. Seen in the light of historical discounts, this change in grid
pricing for heavy cattle is unprecedented. For context, cattle are usually harvested between 12001350 lbs. on live weight basis. Given a 63% dressing percentage, cattle are weighing upwards of
1500 lbs. Assuming an ADG of 3 lbs. per day, cattle harvested were on feed approximately 1.5
to 2 months longer. This would align well with the timing of COVID-19 cases in packing plants.
The underlying makeup of cattle transactions the market is seeing, and previously discussed
above, is likely more due to a change in the grid premiums and discounts than a fundamental
shift in producer preference for the way cattle are transacted. As the grid premiums and discounts
have changed, in some cases dramatically, more cattle have once again shifted away from
negotiated grid towards formula. As the U.S. come out of the COVID-19 quarantine restrictions,
it is likely that share of cattle transactions are likely to normalize to historical levels. Fed cattle
cash prices are likely to increase as a result due to an improvement in domestic retail and food
service beef and export beef demand. Current proposals to increase the number of cattle
transacted through a particular channel is unlikely to affect beef demand derived from consumers
and passed along the supply chain down to producers or alter the current supply of fed cattle
ready for harvest. While their long-term implications are unknown, creating new transaction
prices are unlikely do little to fundamentally change price determination, potentially causing
increased costs and reducing profitability for the beef complex. Consistent with the economic
theory of derived demand, the economic burden of these policies are likely to largely carried by
the cow-calf industry.

Figure 1. Monthly Harvest Premium and Discounts for Carcass Quality between 2018 and 2020:
5-market average (USDA-AMS:LM_CT169).

Figure 2. Monthly Harvest Premium and Discounts for Weight between 2018 and 2020: 5market average (USDA-AMS:LM_CT169).
Elliott Dennis

Assistant Professor and Livestock Marketing Economist
elliott.dennis@unl.edu
Department of Agricultural Economics

